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Abstract—State-of-the-art attacks against cyclic logic obfusca-
tion use satisfiability solvers that are equipped with a set of cycle
avoidance clauses. These cycle avoidance clauses are generated
in a pre-processing step and define various key combinations
that could open or close cycles without making the circuit
oscillating or stateful. In this paper, we show that this pre-
processing step has to generate cycle avoidance conditions on
all cycles in a netlist, otherwise, a missing cycle could trap the
solver in an infinite loop or make it exit with an incorrect key.
Then, we propose several techniques by which the number of
cycles is exponentially increased as a function of the number of
inserted feedbacks. We further illustrate that when the number of
feedbacks is increased, the pre-processing step of the attack faces
an exponential increase in complexity and runtime, preventing
the correct composition of cycle avoidance clauses in a reasonable
time. On the other hand, if the pre-processing is not concluded,
the attack formulated by the satisfiability solver will either get
stuck or exit with an incorrect key. Hence, when the cyclic
obfuscation under the conditions proposed in this paper is
implemented, it would impose an exponentially difficult problem
for the satisfiability solver based attacks.
Index Terms—logic locking, SAT attack, obfuscation.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The cost of building a new semiconductor fab was estimated
to be $5.0 billion in 2015, with large recurring maintenance
costs [1, 2], and sharply increases as technology migrates
to smaller nodes. Thus, to reduce the fabrication cost, and
for economic feasibility, most of the manufacturing and
fabrication is pushed offshore [1]. However, many offshore
fabrication facilities are considered to be untrusted, which
has raised concern over potential attacks in the manufacturing
supply chain, with an intimate knowledge of the fabrication
process, the ability to modify and expand the design before
production, and unavoidable access to the fabricated chips
during testing. Hence, fabrication in untrusted fabs has
introduced multiple forms of security threats from supply
chain including that of overproduction, Trojan insertion,
reverse engineering, intellectual property (IP) theft, and
counterfeiting [2].
To prevent the adversaries from such attacks, researchers
have proposed various obfuscation methods for hiding and/or
locking the functionality of a netlist [3–7]. However, the
validity and strength of logic obfuscation to defend an
IP against adversaries in the manufacturing supply chain
was seriously challenged as researchers demonstrated that
the de-obfuscation attacks leveraging satisfiability (SAT)
solvers [8–10] combined with Signal Probability Skew (SPS)
attacks [11] could break the existing obfuscation schemes
(both locking and camouflaging) in a relatively short time.
Cyclic obfuscation [12] was another approach that was
considered as a defense mechanism against SAT solvers.
However, this technique was later broken by CycSAT
attack [13]. CycSAT added a pre-processing step to the
original SAT attack for detection and avoidance of cycles in
the netlist before deploying an SAT attack. In this paper, we
illustrate that the pre-processing step of CycSAT attack has
to process a cycle avoidance condition for every cycle in the
netlist, otherwise, the subsequent SAT attack could get stuck
in an infinite loop or returns UNSAT. Hence, the runtime of
the pre-processing step is linearly related to the number of
cycles in a netlist. Besides, we illustrate that the generation of
a cycle avoidance clause for a netlist of cyclic Boolean nature
is far more time consuming than an acyclic Boolean logic.
From this observation, we first propose several mechanisms
for cyclification of a non-cyclic Boolean netlist. Then, we
propose two design techniques by which a linear increase
in the number of inserted feedbacks in a netlist would
exponentially increase the number of generated cycles. Since
a successful SAT attack on a cyclic circuit requires the
generation of a per-cycle avoidance clause and considering
that our proposed techniques make the time it takes to
generate such avoidance clauses an exponential function
of the number of inserted feedbacks, CycSAT attack faces
exponential runtime at its processing step. Hence, when
deploying CycSAT, the complexity of the pre-processing of
the resulting cyclic netlist goes beyond a reasonable time
limit. On the other hand, skipping the prepossessing result in
an unsuccessful SAT attack. Hence, cyclic obfuscation, when
constructed using the proposed methodology, proves to be a
strong defense against the SAT and CycSAT attack.
Contributions of this paper are as follows: 1) We provide
a comprehensive background on (both cyclic and acyclic)
SAT-resistant logic-encryption solutions, 2) we introduce a
new attack that enables a SAT attack to break two recently
published logic locking solutions (i.e., obfuscation using
nested or hard cycles), 3) we propose a new cyclic obfuscation
solutions that make the number of created (real and dummy)
cycles an exponential function of the number of inserted
feedbacks, and elaborate how it is as an effective mean
for breaking cyclic SAT attacks, 4) we propose a timing-
aware cyclification algorithm to manage and control the
timing overheads of our proposed solution, 5) we assess the
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2effectiveness of our proposed solutions on several benchmarks
using an improved/modified cyclic attack and report the power,
performance and area overhead of our proposed solution.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section
II, we cover the background on logic obfuscation. Then, in
section III, we elaborate on the limitation of cyclic attacks
and our approach for breaking/preventing these attacks. In
section IV, we introduce our techniques for building an
exponential relation between the number of feedbacks and
the number of created cycles in a circuit. We also introduce
three mechanisms for building a cyclic Boolean function to
further increase the complexity of pre-processing in cyclic
attacks. Our experimental results are summarized in section
VI. Section VII concludes the paper.
II. BACKGROUND
Logic obfuscation is the process of hiding the functionality
of an IP by building ambiguity or by implementing post-
manufacturing means of control and programmability into a
netlist. Gate camouflaging [14–17] and circuit locking [18, 19]
are two of the widely explored obfuscation mechanisms
for this purpose. A camouflaged gate is a gate that after
reverse engineering (using delayering and lithography) could
be mapped to any member of a possible set of gates or may
look like one logic gate (e.g., AND), however functionally
perform as another (e.g., XOR). In locking solutions, the
functionality of a circuit is locked using several key inputs
such that only when a correct key is applied, the circuit
resumes its expected functionality. Otherwise, the correct
function is hidden among many of the 2K (K being the
number of keys) circuit possibilities. The claim raised by
such an obfuscation scheme was that to break the obfuscation,
an adversary needs to try a large number of inputs and key
combinations to extract the correct key, and the difficulty of
this process increases exponentially as the number of keys
and primary inputs increases. Hence, if enough gates are
obfuscated, an adversary faces an unacceptably long time
(claimed as years to decades) to break the obfuscation scheme.
Note that the availability of scan chains, which is inserted
following Design for Test (DFT) recommended flow, allows
an adversary to access combinational logic in each stage of a
sequential circuit, load the desired input, execute the stage for
one cycle, and readout the output.
The validity and strength of logic obfuscation to defend
the IP against adversaries in the manufacturing supply chain
was seriously challenged as researchers demonstrated that the
SAT solvers, when formulated according to Algorithm 1, could
break the obfuscation (both locking and camouflaging) in a
matter of minutes as opposed to the promised claim of years
and decades [8, 9]. In this algorithm, C(X,K, Y ) refers to the
obfuscated circuit that produces output vector Y using input
vector X and key vector K and CBlackBox(X) refers to the
output of the activated circuit for input vector X . As illustrated
in Algorithm 1, to employ a SAT attack, the obfuscated circuit
is transformed into a circuit SAT problem, in which the SAT
solver looks for an input value X for which the obfuscated
circuit produces two different outputs for two different input
keys. Such input is referred to as a Distinguishing Input (DIP)
Algorithm 1 SAT Attack on Obfuscated Circuits
1: DIV C = 1;
2: SATcircuit = C(X,K1, Y1) ∧ C(X,K2, Y2) ∧ (Y1 6= Y2);
3: while ((XDI , K1, K2)← SATF (SATcircuit) = T ) do
4: Yf ← CBlackBox(XDI);
5: DIV C = DIV C ∧ C(XDI , K1, Yf ) ∧ C(XDI , K2, Yf );
6: SATcircuit = SATcircuit ∧DIV C;
7: KeyGenCircuit = DIV C ∧ (K1 = K2)
8: Key ← SATF (KeyGenCircuit)
XDI . Each time a new XDI is found, the circuit SAT is
updated to make sure that the next two keys that will be found
in the next iteration of SAT solver invocation, produce the
same output for all previously discovered XDI . This is done
by building a Distinguishing Input Validation Circuit (DIVC)
as illustrated in Algorithm 1. When the SAT solver can no
longer find a XDI , the DIVC circuit contains a complete set
of distinguishing inputs. At this point, any key that satisfies
the DIVC (by calling a SAT solver on this circuit) is the key
to the obfuscated circuit [8, 9, 20].
A. Acyclic Logic Obfuscation
The revelation of this attack redirected the attention of the
researchers to find harder obfuscation schemes that protect
acyclic Boolean logic and resist the SAT attack. These methods
have targeted a number of weaknesses in the SAT attack and
could be categorized into three categories:
1- Weaker Distinguishing Inputs: Original SAT attack
was powerful because each DIP could rule out several wrong
keys and constrain the key space effectively. The SARLock
and Anti-SAT [21, 22] logic locking methods were proposed
to mitigate this vulnerability. In a circuit protected by these
solutions, a wrong key produces a wrong output only for one
input. This will create a much weaker DIP as each DIP can
only rule out one wrong key. Hence, a SAT attack will be
reduced to a Brute-force attack as it requires an exponential
number of DIPs to find the correct key. A design protected by
these mechanisms, regardless of the key used for its activation,
behaves very similar to the original design (except for one
input). Hence, this group of obfuscation solutions suffers from
low output corruption. To increase the output corruption, they
could be augmented with other (output corruption oriented)
obfuscation mechanisms. However, by using approximate SAT
attack [23] almost all key values for the augmented obfuscation
mechanism could be correctly identified.
Further research revealed that these obfuscation techniques
are vulnerable to removal [11], Bypass [24] and FALL [25]
attacks. In a removal attack, these SAT hard blocks are
identified using Signal Probability Skew (SPS) attack [11]
and removed. In Bypass attack [24], an auxiliary circuit that
recovers the wrong output in these locking schemes is created.
This attack identifies the input combinations that produce the
wrong output for a wrong key; then it adds a bypass circuit
to flip the wrong output when that specific input is applied.
In FALL attacks, a functional analysis of the circuit will be
performed and have two stages. In the first stage, it analyses
the functionality of the obfuscated circuit and tries to identify
the locking keys. If there was more than one candidate for the
locking key, it tries to use the SAT to find the correct locking
key from a list of alternatives and using simulations on the
unlocked circuit.
32- Increasing Circuit-SAT Complexity: Another feature
that makes the SAT attack powerful is the fast execution time
of the underlying SAT solver in solving the circuit SAT and
extracting DIPs. For locking schemes in this category, the
netlist is designed in a way that translates to a large circuit-
SAT with possibly a SAT-hard portion and thus requires more
time to solve. Cross-Lock [26] exploited this vulnerability
by adding cross-bars to the netlist and obfuscates circuit
connections. Equivalent circuit-SAT in this method requires
large multiplexers and the symmetric nature of this block will
make it a SAT-hard problem [27–29]. Without any additional
clauses, any SAT solver requires a long execution time to find
a single distinguishing input.
Netlists with camouflaged or memory-based blocks could
also be used for this purpose. For these blocks, an equivalent
circuit should be used that replaces them. For blocks with a
large number of input and key ports, the equivalent circuit
could be very large. This is especially true in the case of a
locked circuit with large LUTs. This could lead to a large
circuit-SAT with lots of SAT clauses.
3- SAT Unsolvable Structures: SAT attack needs to
translate the reverse-engineered netlist into CNF clauses to be
able to use the underlying SAT solver. Memory-blocks and
Boolean gates could be easily translated into CNF clauses
using equivalent circuits and Tseitin [30] transformation.
Boolean limitation of SAT solvers could be used as a
vulnerability to implement non-Boolean structures to counter
the SAT attack.
Delay Locking [31] is one of such methods. It uses
key-gates to lock both the functionality and the timing
behavior of the obfuscated circuits. The logic aspect of the
locking could be easily translated to CNF, however, the
behavioral (timing) aspect of circuit operation can not be easily
translated into a SAT friendly CNF. Hence, formulating a
SAT attack on a delay-locked netlist will produce a circuit
of correct functionality, but the timing violations will make
the circuit malfunctioning. This method could potentially
prevent overproduction or any reuse of fabrication materials
like masks, but it can not prevent reverse engineering and IP-
theft of the design. Also, an attack called TimingSAT [32] was
later proposed to break this obfuscation method.
B. Cyclic Logic Obfuscation
Another method that could render SAT solvers ineffective is
to invalidate the acyclic nature of netlist by using cyclic logic
obfuscation. Cyclic logic obfuscation was first proposed in
[12] whereby introducing feedbacks in the netlist, the netlist is
no longer a Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG). In their approach,
each intentionally created cycle had more than one way to be
opened, making such cycle irreducible by structural analysis,
claiming that the existence of such a cycle breaks the original
SAT attack in [8, 9].
Attacks previously proposed for breaking logic locking
solutions are not effective on cyclically obfuscated circuits.
The brute-force attack on obfuscated circuits (even those
that are not SAT-hard) will face exponential difficulty. The
sensitization attack would not work on cyclic circuits since
Algorithm 2 CycSAT Attack on Cyclic Obfuscated Circuits
1: Find a set of feedback signals (w0, w1, ...wm);
2: Compute ”no structural path” formulas F (w0, w′0), ..., F (wm, w
′
m);
3: NC(K) = ∧mi=0F (wi, w′i)
4: C(X,K, Y ) = C(X,K, Y ) ∧NC(K)
5: SATcircuit = C(X,K1, Y1) ∧ C(X,K2, Y2) ∧ (Y1 6= Y2);
6: while ((XDI , K1, K2)← SATF (SATcircuit) = T ) do
7: Yf ← CBlackBox(XDI);
8: DIV C = DIV C ∧ C(XDI , K1, Yf ) ∧ C(XDI , K2, Yf );
9: SATcircuit = SATcircuit ∧DIV C;
10: KeyGenCircuit = DIV C ∧ (K1 = K2)
11: Key ← SATF (KeyGenCircuit)
key values control the multiplexers’ select line and the select
values can not be sensitized to output pins. The pure SAT
attack does not work on cyclic circuits as cycles could
either trap the SAT solver or make it exit with an incorrect
key, a problem that also occurs in approximate SAT attacks
(i.e., AppSAT); the approximate attacks address the issue
of separating the keys between SAT-hard and conventional
obfuscation. Considering that cyclic circuits trap the SAT
solver, this group of attack is also would not work. Removal
and SPS attacks are aimed at detecting and removing point
functions which are used as a means of building SAT hard
solutions in the DAG-based network. Considering that the
cyclic obfuscation does not use a point function, SPS and
removal attacks are not applicable.
Cyclic obfuscation was later broken with introduction of
cyclic (cycle-aware) attacks in [13, 33, 34]. CycSAT was the
first cyclic attack, details of which are shortly discussed. Later,
Chen [33] introduced an enhanced SAT-attack that considers
structural cycles. From a functional standpoint, this attack acts
similar to the structural attack in CycSAT.
In CycSAT attack, before invoking the SAT solver, the
netlist is checked for key conditions that may result in the
creation of cycles. These conditions are translated to a set of
cycle avoidance clauses and are added to the list of clauses that
represent the circuit SAT problem. The algorithm 2 illustrates
the flow of utilizing the cycle avoidance-clauses in CycSAT.
In this algorithm, (w0, w1, ...wm) is a collection of feedback
signals whose break will make the encrypted circuit acyclic
and w′i is a signal that feeds to wi before the break. The
function F (wi, j) is a function that construct the condition
for ”having no structural path” between signal wi to signal j.
The F (wi, j) is computed by starting from a feedback signal
wi and constructs a string of clauses that satisfy the following
condition while traversing a cycle:
F (wi, j) =
∧
l∈NK(j)
F (wi, l) ∨ bk(l, j) (1)
In this function, the NK(j) are the non-key inputs of
signal j, and bk(l, j) is the condition on the key assuring
key does not affect j. This function is initiated with condition
F (wi, wi) = 0 and finishes after completing the loop. In
this case, the condition for no structural path is tested on all
discovered feedback signals in line 3 of the algorithm.
Subsequently, Rezaie et al. proposed two solutions [35, 36]
to counter CycSAT attack. In the first solution [35], by adding
hard cycles to the original netlist, they create a situation that
any traversal of the feedback signals will miss a cycle. Also,
for this method, dependent cycles are added to the original
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Fig. 1. Cyclification with dependent cycles: (a) Original circuit, (b) cyclified with an auxiliary-circuit that acts as a buffer, (c) Obfuscated auxiliary circuit,
(d) auxiliary circuit with broken outer cycle, (e) auxiliary circuit with broken inner cycle.
circuit such that two nested cycles should be closed to create
a working circuit. In the second solution [36], a method is
introduced to create cycles that behave non-combinational
in unreachable states. However, in the next section, after
providing further detail on these locking mechanisms, we
illustrate that these solutions are still vulnerable and a simple
modification to CycSAT attack could easily break them.
Finding all cycles in a cyclic circuit (a requirement for
CycSAT attack) is not an easy task. Recently, Shen et al.
introduced a new attack called BeSAT [34]. Authors of this
attack argue that “it is impossible to capture all cycles in any
graph with any set of feedback signals as done in CycSAT
algorithm”. To address this problem, BeSAT first adds “no
structural path” (CycSAT-I) conditions for a “set of feedback
signals”. This is similar to the pre-processing step in CycSAT
attack. Then, it performs SAT while monitoring the behavior
of the attack: during the DIP generation process, due to the
missing NC clauses, it is possible that solving the circuit-
SAT problem results in repeated DIPs. Under the original
SAT attack, this could trap the attack in an infinite loop. In
BeSAT, every new DIP is compared with previous DIPs and if
it was generated before, the algorithm uses it to determine the
stateful key Ks. BeSAT compares the output of the new DIP
for the two found keys with the oracle circuit. The output
of the stateful key disagrees with the oracle circuit. Then,
the found stateful key will be explicitly banned by adding
(K1 6= Ks ∧ K2 6= Ks) condition to the circuit-SAT problem.
After finding all DIPs and banning all stateful keys, BeSAT
begins pruning oscillating keys by employing ternary SAT.
III. ANALYZING THE WEAKNESSES OF CYCLIC
OBFUSCATION
In this section, we first show that the nested cycles could
not guarantee a secure cyclic obfuscation. Furthermore, we
propose a new attack mechanism to break the hard cycles.
Then, we investigate the weaknesses of CycSAT attack,
according to which we propose a new mechanism for cyclic
obfuscation.
A. Breaking Nested Cycles
An obfuscation method that was previously proposed to
counter CycSAT attack is the use of nested cycles [35]. In this
method, the original circuit is augmented with a pair of nested
cycles such that for correct operation, both cycles should be
closed. An example of such a transformation is shown in Fig.
1.b for the original circuit in Fig. 1.a. After the transformation,
the nested cycles are a needed and valid part of the original
circuit and attempting to remove one or both cycles will affect
Algorithm 3 Generating RC Clauses for Dependent Cycles
1: procedure REDUCTION ATTACK(circuit K)
2: Find and sort all cycles in K by their length C = (c0, c1, ...cm);
3: for all ci in C do
4: RC(ci) = φ;
5: for all ci in C do
6: if IS COMB CYCLE(ci) == False then;
7: RC(ci) = RC(ci) ∨ opened(ci);
8: while cj ← next outer cycle do
9: sub circuit← sub-circuit of closed ci and cj ;
10: if IS COMB CYCLE(sub circuit) then
11: RC(ci) = RC(ci) ∨ (closed(ci) ∧ closed(cj));
12: RC(cj) = RC(cj) ∨ (closed(ci) ∧ closed(cj));
13: RC(K) = RC(K) ∧ RC(ci);
1: procedure IS COMB CYCLE(sub circuit S)
2: r, r′ ← input and output of auxiliary-circuit;
3: if SAT (Sopened ∧ (r 6= r′)) then
4: return False;
5: else
6: return True;
the correct functionality of the circuit. A designer may try to
obfuscate these cycles using multiplexers as shown in Fig. 1.c.
Direct application of structural CycSAT attack, as claimed
by authors in [35] results in breaking each of nested cycles
separately, creating an oscillating and un-SAT-isfiable circuit.
However, as claimed earlier, we can still deploy a successful
attack against this variant of cyclic obfuscation using a simple
modification to the pre-processing step of CycSAT attack.
For this purpose, during the pre-processing step, in addition
to composing the ”no sensitizable path” clauses (as proposed
in [13]), we compose and include a new set of clauses that
consider ”reducibility” as an alternative option to opening
the loops. In this picture, the cycle could either be opened
(using no sensitizable path clauses) or could be reduced using
newly added reducible clauses. The reducible clauses are
defined for possible dependent cycles that implement specific
functions between their inputs and outputs. These clauses will
be generated for each cycle by pairing it with matching outer
cycles. The process of generating the reducible clauses is
captured in the Algorithm 3. The reduction attack procedure,
first, sorts all cycles according to their length and then begins
processing them from the shortest to the longest cycle. For
each cycle, it checks if the cycle is combinational if it is
not, it tries to find an outer cycle that makes its behavior
combinational. In this algorithm, the IS COMB CY CLE()
validates if a sub-circuit containing a cycle is combinational
or not. For this purpose, the function disconnects the cycles by
breaking the feedback into two disconnected wire segments r
and r′. Then by using a SAT solver, it checks if there are any
values for the wires that r 6= r′. If such a scenario was not
found, it classifies the sub-circuit as a combinational circuit.
Otherwise, a non-combinational circuit, according to which
the necessary clauses are generated.
5V
u
Zw
Ki
Kk
Kj
Fig. 2. An example for a circuit obfuscated with a hard cycle. Added Key-
gates are shown in red, and the riginal wires are shown with dotted lines.
This algorithm could be applied to any netlist obfuscated
using the auxiliary-circuit such as the one in Fig. 1.c. This
circuit has two cycles c1 ={X2} and c2 ={X1, X2}. The
smallest cycle c1 is oscillating and oscillates when X1 output
is 1 as shown in Fig. 1.d. By considering this cycle as
closed and pairing it with its only outer cycle c2 we will
have RC(c1) = k′0 ∨ (k0 ∧ k1). The outer cycle c2 as
shown in Fig. 1.e is also non-combinational and the reducible
clauses will be RC(c2) = k′1 ∨ (k0 ∧ k1). Thus, by closing
both cycles, as shown in Fig. 1.b it can be derived that
r′ = r ⊕ r′ ⊕ r′ = r and the circuit does act as a buffer
with no oscillation. The reducible clause for this circuit will
be RC(K) = (k′0 ∨ (k0 ∧ k1)) ∧ (k′1 ∨ (k0 ∧ k1)) for closing
both cycles or opening both cycles since non of them has
combinational behavior independently.
It should be noted that these auxiliary-circuits could be
in the form of partially intercepted cycles, where more than
one outer cycle is partially intercepted with another outer
cycle. We acknowledge that for partially intercepted cycles,
our proposed algorithm would not work, and an alternative
algorithm that generates the NC condition by considering the
partially intercepted combinational cycles is required.
B. Breaking Hard Cycles
Hard cycles were proposed in [35] to create a situation
that any traversal of feedback signals will miss a cycle. An
example is shown in Fig. 2, where the original circuit consists
of gates U, V, W, and Z. In the obfuscated netlist, the gate
U is connected to V and Z, and W is connected to Z. By
creating a hard cycle, new connections using AND gates have
been added. These new wires connect (V, W), (W, U) and (Z,
U) and shown with thicker lines. Feedback sets for the new
circuit are {V, W} and {Z, U}. Application of CycSAT attack
on this circuit misses the larger cycle {U, V, W, Z, U}, and
the attack fails.
Hard cycles could be easily broken by modifying the
mechanisms used for the computation of F (wi, j). The
F (wi, j) could be computed in two ways: (i) traversing
through a cycle starting from wi until wi is visited again and
ignoring the cycle break conditions imposed by fanins of other
nested cycles; or (ii) traversing through one cycle and adding
the cycle break conditions imposed by other nested cycle. As
shown for the example in Fig. 2 and the next example, the first
choice results in missing some ”no cycle” (NC) conditions,
leaving cycles in a design that could break the subsequent
SAT attack. By choosing the condition (ii), we show that it
is possible to build the NC condition by visiting all cycles in
the netlist without missing any of the hard cycles. To better
illustrate this concept, consider the following example: For the
obfuscated netlist in Fig. 3 and a topological sort from gate A,
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Fig. 3. (a) The Original circuit (b) The flow diagram of the obfuscated circuit
(c) The Cyclically Obfuscated circuit.
the edge E and F are identified as feedbacks. When following
rule (i), and after building the NC condition we will have:
1: F (F,A) = F (F, F ) ∨ bk(k1) = k′1
2: F (F, F ′) = F (F,A) ∨ bk(k2) = k′1 ∨ k2
3: F (E,C) = F (E,E) ∨ bk(k2) = k′2
4: F (E,E′) = F (E,C) ∨ bk(k3) = k′2 ∨ k′3
5: NC = F (F, F ′) ∧ F (E,E′) = (k′1 ∨ k2) ∧ (k′2 ∨ k′3)
The problem with this assignment is when (k1, k2, k3) =
(1, 1, 0). In this case, the NC condition is satisfied, however,
the larger nested cycle {E,F,G,E} is not broken. Hence,
the NC condition would not resolve the cycles if nested or
multi-path scenarios exist. In this case, if the wrong key
(k1, k2, k3) = (1, 1, 0) is chosen by SAT solver, it will enter a
loop. Depending on whether the cycle is oscillating or stateful,
the SAT solver will either be trapped in an infinite loop or will
exit UNSAT. Note that this infinite loop happens during the
execution of the SAT solver and not during the topological
sort used in the original SAT attack proposed in [8, 9].
To avoid the problem imposed by rule (i), we need to follow
the rule (ii) where the key contribution of all fanins in all
stages are considered. When using rule (ii) for building the
NC condition for the same circuit we have:
1: F (F,A) = F (F, F ) ∨ bk(k1) = k′1
2: F (F, F ′) = (F (F,A) ∨ bk(k2)) ∧ (F (F,E) ∨ bk(k2)) = (k′1 ∨ k2) ∧
(k′1 ∨ k3 ∨ k′2)
3: F (E,C) = F (E,E) ∨ bk(k2) = k′2
4: F (E,E′) = (F (E,C) ∨ bk(k3)) ∧ (F (E,G) ∨ bk(k3)) = (k′2 ∨ k′3) ∧
(k′2 ∨ k′1 ∨ k3)
5: NC = F (C,C′)∧ F (E,E′) = (k′2 ∨ k′3)∧ (k′1 ∨ k′2 ∨ k3)∧ (k′1 ∨ k2).
By following the rule (ii), the previous assignment of keys
(k1, k2, k3) = (1, 1, 0) will no longer be a valid assignment,
preventing the SAT solver from being stuck or exiting with
a wrong key. However, in this case, all cycles in the design
have to be traversed and conditioned. As a matter of fact,
given the way the NC is formulated in [13], to derive the ”no
structural path” condition, some of the combinational cycles
(such as {E,F,G,E} in Fig. 3) have been visited more than
once. Hence, the number of times the key conditions have to
be generated is even larger than the number of netlist cycles.
The problem of visiting nested cycles more than once in
CycSAT attack could be resolved by a slight modification to
CycSAT pre-processing step. In the modified attack, instead
of applying rule (ii) on one-cycle-per feedback, we could
apply the rule (i) on all cycles. It is intuitive to see that
both approaches produce the same NC clauses. For example,
in Fig. 3 when following condition (i), and traversing cycle
{E,F,G,E}, the condition (k′1 ∨ k′2 ∨ k3) is generated.
6Hence, by ANDing the generated condition to the two clauses
generated by applying the rule (i), the NC condition of rule
(ii) is generated. However, in this case, the combinational
cycle {E,F,G,E} is only visited once. Even by considering
the improvement suggested in CycSAT formulation, it still
requires visiting all cycles in a netlist to compose the NC
clauses. This necessity, as described in the next section,
becomes one of the key features which is used in this paper
to break CycSAT attack.
A different method of introducing complexity is by
eliminating the DAG nature of the original netlist and by
transforming it into a Boolean cyclic function, which could
be represented using a Directed Cyclic Graph (DCG), before
subjecting it to cyclic obfuscation. If the original netlist
is not a DAG, CycSAT pre-processing step has to build
the NC condition by checking for ”no sensitizable path”
condition [13], instead of ”no structural path” condition.
The no sensitizable path condition from [13] is recited in
equation 2:
F (wi, j) =
∧
l∈fanin(j)
F (wi, l) ∨ ns(l, j) (2)
The ”no sensitizable path” condition generates a clause for
each multi-input gate in a cycle. As a result, NC clauses
are much longer and much weaker. Hence, adding even a
small number of feedbacks to such circuits (that have valid
Boolean cycles) for obfuscation, will significantly increase
the size of the circuit-SAT problem, as the ”no sensitizable
path” condition has to be generated for all cycles. To illustrate
the weaker and longer nature of the NC clauses, the ”no
sensitizable path condition” for the circuit in Fig. 3 is
constructed below:
1: F (F,A) = F (F, F ) ∨ ns(F,A) = k′1
2: F (F,B) = F (F,A) ∨ ns(A,B) = k′1 ∨ x′2
3: F (F, F ′) = (F (F,B) ∨ ns(B,F ′)) ∧ (F (F,E) ∨ ns(E,F ′)) = (k′1 ∨
x′2 ∨ k2) ∧ (k′1 ∨ k3 ∨ k′2)
4: F (E,C) = F (E,E) ∨ ns(E,C) = k′2
5: F (E,D) = F (E,C) ∨ ns(C,D) = k′2
6: F (E,E′) = (F (E,D) ∨ ns(D,E′)) ∧ (F (E,G) ∨ ns(G,E′)) =
(k′2 ∨ k′3) ∧ (k′2 ∨ k′1 ∨ x′2 ∨ k3)
7: NC = F (F, F ′)∧F (E,E′) = (k′1 ∨ x′2 ∨ k2)∧ (k′1 ∨ k3 ∨ k′2)∧ (k′2 ∨
k′3) ∧ (k′2 ∨ k′1 ∨ x′2 ∨ k3)
IV. SRC-LOCK: THE PROPOSED CYCLIC OBFUSCATION
The issue with the original method of generating cycle
avoidance (NC) clauses using CycSAT was shown and
discussed in section II-B using two simple examples in which
traversal of wires based on a single topological sort of gates
resulted in a missing cycle. When using the original CycSAT,
because of the missing NC clauses for such cycles and due
to the randomness of assigned key and input values by the
SAT solver, the SAT attack can be stuck in an infinite loop or
exit with a wrong key. The possibility of facing an oscillating
or stateful cycle greatly increases as the number of generated
cycles in the design increases to a point that majority of key-
space (to be tested by SAT solver) could result in oscillating
or stateful cycles, vanishing the chances of a successful attack
to unreasonably small probability. On the other hand, attacks
such as BeSAT [34] that can track the behavior of the SAT
attack at runtime, could detect oscillating or stateful scenarios
(due to missing cycles in pre-processing time) and eliminate
the incorrect key. However, at runtime, the BeSAT eliminates
one key at a time. Hence, it is successful if the number of
such key combinations are small. In other words, the BeSAT
attack run time is linearly dependent on the number of such
keys. When such key combinations are (exponentially) large
(which is the case in our to-be-proposed obfuscation solution),
the BeSAT attack’s runtime becomes unacceptably large.
CycSAT pre-processing time is characterized in equation 3.
As illustrated, the processing time is linearly related to the
number of discovered cycles N and the time for composing
the NC condition tNC per cycle. Our approach for breaking
CycSAT is to exponentially increase the time needed for
composing the NC condition in the pre-processing step of
CycSAT beyond acceptable. This is achieved by exponentially
increasing the number of cycles N in a design with respect to
the number of inserted feedbacks m, and increasing the time
required for processing each cycle (tNC) by forcing the pre-
processing step to consider the ”no sensitizable path” condition
instead of ”no structural path”. Next, we provide two solutions
for building an exponential relation between the number of
feedbacks and number of generated cycles, and three solutions
for converting an acyclic circuit to a valid cyclic circuit.
TNC =
N∑
i=1
tNC | N = 2m (3)
A. Exponentially increasing the number of cycles in a netlist
In order to exponentially increase the number of cycles in a
given netlist with respect to the number of inserted feedbacks,
we introduce two approaches: (1) building Super Cycles (SC)
and, (2) building Logarithmic Feedback Networks (LFN).
1) Building Super Cycles (SC): The process of building a
SC is illustrated in Fig. 4. A Micro Cycle (MC) is a cycle
created by following the cycle creation conditions adopted
from [12], which are recited below:
MC Condition 1: Any created cycle has to be non-reducible,
MC Condition 2: At least n ≥ 2 edges in each small cycle
have to be removable.
A reducible cycle has a single entry point. Hence, the depth-
first-search (DFS) traversal of a netlist that only contains
reducible cycles is unique. This allows the reducible cycles
to be easily opened by removing a unique set of feedback
edges which can be found efficiently [12]. By having multiple
entries into each MC, the non-reducible condition is satisfied,
forcing an adversary to use CycSAT pre-processing step to
generate the necessary cycle avoidance clauses before invoking
the SAT solver. In graph theory, a strongly connected graph
is defined as a graph with at least one path between any
two pairs of its vertices. adopting from this definition, in
our solution, a SC is defined as a strongly connected graph
of MCs. To substantially increase the number of generated
cycles, in the last step of SC generation, the edge density of
the generated strongly connected graph is increased, creating
additional paths between MCs. The process of building a SC
is summarized in Algorithm 4.
In this algorithm, the requirement of generating the MCs in
the fanin of the smallest number of primary outputs increases
the likelihood of shared and/or connecting edges between
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connections to their fan-in cones, which is not illustrated in this figure. 
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Fig. 4. Building a Super Cycle from 7 gate MC. (a) A path segment containing
7 gates, (b) building a Micro Cycle, (c) building a SC by strongly connecting
multiple MCs.
Algorithm 4 Steps for building a Super Cycle
1: Construct MCs in the fanin of smallest possible number of primary
outputs.
2: Strongly connect all generated MCs (this, as illustrated in Fig. 4.b, is
done by creating a two-way connection between each newly created MC,
and the existing SC).
3: Select signals in MCs (A, B, C, D in Fig. 4.c) that are not used for SC
connectivity and provide a two way path from them to unused edges in
other MCs or random signals in their fanin cone.
created MCs. By having all MCs strongly connected, we create
the possibility of larger combinational cycles. And finally,
adding the random connections, increase the density of the
edges in the strongly connected graph, increasing the number
of resulting cycles. In the results section, we illustrate that the
number of created cycles, generated from following these steps
as described in Algorithm 4, becomes an exponential function
of the number of inserted feedbacks.
Lemma. The lower bound on the number of cycles created
when using SC is 2m, when m is the number of inserted
feedbacks.
Informal Proof. The proposed SC method adds two paths
(from and to paths) to connect each new cycle to the existing
SC. This way, the new cycle could be added or not added to
any of the previously existing cycles. Hence, the addition of
a new cycle at least double the number of potential cycles.
Note that the number of connecting edges between the new
cycle and the existing cycle could be more than one, resulting
in an increase in the number of cycles with a much higher
rate. From this discussion, after inserting m feedbacks and
connecting them, at least 2m cycles will be created. 
2) Building Logarithmic Feedback Networks (LFN): In
this method, as illustrated in Fig. 5.a, several logic paths
(preferably from the fanin cone of a single primary output)
are selected. Then, by breaking a wire in the midpoint of
each logic path, we create two smaller logic segments. The
signal entering and the signal exiting each half segment is
marked as its start point (SP) and endpoint (EP) respectively.
Then, the SP and EP of multiple such logic path segments are
used to build a logarithmic switching network (e.g., Omega,
Butterfly, Benes, or Banyan network). When connecting M
number of EPs to M number of SPs, for Ms of power of
2, we need M(1 + log2(M)) multiplexers for a logarithmic
I1 SP1A EP1A SP1B EP1B O1
I2 SP2A EP2A SP2B
EP2B O2
(a)
I1
SP1A EP1A
I2
SP1B EP1B
SP2A
SP2B
EP2A
EP2B
O1
O2
(b)
EP1A
EP1B
EP2A
EP2B
SP1A
SP1B
SP2A
SP2B
(c)
Fig. 5. Building a logarithmic feedback network in which the number of
cycles exponentially increase with the number of feedbacks.
network. In this case, when the correct key is applied, the
switching network is configured correctly, otherwise, invalid
connectivity obfuscates the netlist functionality.
Lemma. The lower bound on the number of cycles created
when using LFN is
∑m
l=1
(
m
l
)
(l− 1)!, when m is the number
of inserted feedbacks and l is the cycle size divided by 2.
Informal Proof. The proposed LFN is a special case of a
complete bipartite graph that contains no odd cycles. Suppose
that SEij indicates a vertex from SPi to EPj . Similarly,
ESij indicates a vertex from EPi to SPj . For l = 2, the
cycles are all paths from a SP to its corresponding EP and
return path {SEii, ESii}. If we start from SPi, the second
visited node is its EP (EPi). Since each EP is connected
to all SPs, for intermediate nodes, we have all permutations
as alternative possible paths. Cycles with l = 2, have no
intermediate node. So, there are
(
m
1
)
0! cycles when l = 2. For
l = 4, the cycles are paths like {SEii, ESij , SEjj , ESji}.
There is only one intermediate node in cycles when l = 4
resulting in
(
m
2
)
1! cycles. Similarly, for l = 6, the cy-
cles are paths like {SEii, ESij , SEjj , ESjk, SEkk, ESki}.
Since, we have two intermediate nodes, j and k, we
should consider their permutation as a new cycle, i.e.
{SEii, ESik, SEkk, ESkj , SEjj , ESji}. So, for l = 6, we
have
(
m
3
)
2!. With similar relation, for l = 8, we have(
m
4
)
3! cycles. We can extend this relation to all cycles with
different length. The summation of these cycles indicates
the number of cycles in our logarithmic network, which is∑m
l=1
(
m
l
)
(l − 1)!. 
Note that
∑m
l=1
(
m
l
)
(l−1)! is the lower bound of the number
of simple and nested cycles created by using the logarithmic
network. The number of paths from each SP to each EP
could be more than 1, and there are possibilities of having
a connection between SPs and EPs of the different paths in
the original circuit, increasing the number of cycle possibilities
to a far larger number. Based on the lower bound formula, the
number of created cycles is O(
∑m
l=1
(
m
l
)
(l−1)!) ≤ O(m!) =
O(mm). Hence, there exists an exponential relation between
the number of inserted feedbacks and the number of resulting
cycles in the netlist.
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Fig. 7. Due to correlation of intermediate signals, certain signal combinations
may never occur.
B. Building Cyclic Boolean Functions
A Boolean function does not need to be acyclic. Further-
more, it is possible to reduce the number of gates in a circuit if
a function could be implemented in its acyclic form [37–40].
For example, the work in [40] presents an n-input 2n-output
positive unate Boolean function which can be realized with
2n two-input gates when feedback is used but requires 3n−2
gates if the feedback is not used. Hence, cyclification of a
circuit in addition to forcing CycSAT pre-processing step to
consider the ”no sensitizable path”, could also remedy the area
overhead of introducing new gates for cyclic obfuscation. To
cyclify a netlist and to increase the tNC in Equation 3, we
suggest three approaches: (1) Template-based cyclic-function
mapping, (2) Input-dependency based cycle generation and,
(3) Node-merging cycle generation.
1) Template-based cyclic-function mapping: In this ap-
proach, many small cyclic Boolean circuits are collected as
templates in our obfuscation library. Then, a netlist is scanned
for opportunities (with and without logic manipulation) to
replace a cluster of logic gates with such templates. An
example of such feedback template is the circuit introduced
in [40] where a special case of it (for 3 inputs) is illustrated
in Fig. 6. To introduce cycles, the circuit could be modified to
introduce at least one of the possible functions in this circuit.
The candidate logic cluster is then replaced by the template. To
prevent template scanning and removal attacks, in a subsequent
camouflaging step (using the gate and route obfuscation) the
template will be hidden. Note that many such templates could
be made [37–40], and by not knowing the template type and
the camouflaged technique used to hide the connection, an
attacker can not identify and remove these templates.
2) Input-dependency based cycle generation: This method
explores the correlations between signals that share common
primary inputs in their fanin cone. Considering N such signals
in an arbitrary stage of a DAG, some of the 2N inputs may
never occur. For example, when tracking 4 signals A, B, C,
and D in Fig. 7, we may find that ABCD = {0010} could
not occur. A SAT solver could be used for finding the non-
occurring input scenarios; This process is illustrated in Fig.
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Fig. 8. Input-dependency-based cyclification of a Boolean function. (a) SR-
latch (b) original circuit (c) cyclified circuit when ABCD = 0010 is non-
occurring. (d) obfuscated cyclified circuit using additional random inputs
E,F,G,H and M .
7, where the logic clusters L2 and L3 are removed, and the
4 signals are ANDed together such that for a certain case,
for example, ABCD = 0010, the output of AND gate is
evaluated to 1. Then, this circuit is given to a SAT solver
to find a satisfying input assignment. If SAT solver returns
UNSAT, this combination of input is chosen since it would
never happen, otherwise, a different combination is checked.
In the next step, we use a sequential element and tie the
discovered non-occurring input scenario to the state preserving
input of the sequential element. For example, by using an SR-
latch in Fig. 8.a, If SR = 11 doesn’t happen, the Qnext is
the inverse of input S. Hence, we can build a circuit that ties
the discovered non-occurring input scenario to the SR = 11.
For example, let’s assume wires A, B, C and D have a non-
occurring combination ABCD = 0010 and these signals
construct the signal Y = A+B +CD. Fig 8.c illustrates the
signal Y reconstructed when the non-occurring combination of
the inputs is tied to SR input of the latch. After generating the
cyclic logic, to hide the correlation between input signals, the
wire selection is obfuscated. Finally, the SR-latch feedback
is obfuscated using a set of multiplexers. This assures that
CycSAT can only generate the correct NC clauses if the ”no
sensitizable path” condition is processed, otherwise, it breaks
the SR-latch feedback and invalidates the netlist.
3) Node-merging based cycle generation: The third
approach for cyclification of a netlist is based on the work
in [37] where the logic implication is used to identify
cyclifiable structure candidates directly, or to create them
aggressively in circuits. At its core, the work in [37] introduces
active combinational feedback cycles by merging two nodes in
the original DAG. To check the validity of the generated cyclic
netlist, they use a SAT-based algorithm and validate whether
the formed cycles are combinational or not.
V. TIMING AWARE CYCLIC OBFUSCATION
During logic locking, each modification to the original
netlist affects the timing characteristics of the original circuit.
A timing oblivious obfuscation solution could result in
changes to the delay of one or more timing critical path(s)
(via insertion of key gates), leading to a slower design. In this
section, we argue that our proposed obfuscation solution could
be designed to be timing-aware, minimizing (or removing) the
9Algorithm 5 Timing Aware Cyclic Obfuscation
1: procedure SWITCH INSERTION(int required paths, circuit K)
2: largest cone ← output port with largest cone;
3: b = BFS(largest cone);
4: while (number of inserted feedbacks < required paths) do
5: tail ← pop(b);
6: if (slack(tail) > delay of a keygate and tail not marked) then
7: path ← DFS on tail considering slacks;
8: mark path as selected in the circuit;
9: add feedback to the path;
10: update the circuit’s timing using STA/EDA;
11: for (each selected path) do
12: for (each gate in the path) do
13: if (slack(gate) > delay of a multiplexer) then
14: disconnect gate output;
15: insert multiplexer;
16: connect gate and multiplexer based on SC/LFN;
17: update circuit timing using STA/EDA;
impact of obfuscation on circuit timing. This can be achieved
by incorporating a simple static timing analysis (STA) in our
obfuscation procedure.
Our proposed solution for timing-aware cyclic obfuscation
is presented in Algorithm 5. Both SC and LFN methods
(supported in this algorithm) require selection of non-
overlapping logic paths in the circuit for intertwined cycle
creation. In our solution, presented in Algorithm 5, we find
these non-overlapping logic paths in the fan-in cone (FIC) of a
single primary output. The reason for selecting the logic paths
in the same FIC is to take advantage of existing connections
between selected logic sub-paths when one sub-path is in the
FIC of at least one of the gates in the other sub-path. This
condition results in the generation of many additional cycles,
on top of those generated by LFN or SC. This is because
each feedback could create a cycle when combined with each
of path forward edges. After selection of a logic sub-path and
before committing to the insertion of a new switch, the netlist
is assessed for timing violation. If there is no violation, the
cycle is generated and the slack of affected timing paths are
updated. Finally, the logic gates in the selected sub-path are
marked as used, removing them from future searches.
Our proposed algorithm selects new logic paths in the FIC
of the selected primary output until there are no more viable
sub-paths. The algorithm could be modified to continue finding
new paths by selecting the next primary output candidate that
has the largest number of un-used gates.
VI. RESULTS
In this section, we analyze the effectiveness of our proposed
defense against SAT, CycSAT, and BeSAT attacks. For finding
cycles in a netlist (after cyclic obfuscation), we implemented
the cycle identification algorithm proposed in [41] using
C++. Considering that the source code for BeSAT was not
openly available, we implemented the BeSAT attack based
on the description in [34] using Yices SAT solver [42]. Our
computational platform is a Dell PowerEdge R620 equipped
with Intel Xeon E5-2670 and 64GB of RAM. We used ISCAS-
85 benchmarks listed and described in Table I to evaluate our
solution and to compare it with the prior work. The timeout
limit in our experiments is set to 10 hours: If an experiment
does not conclude within the timeout limit, its table entry is
marked as “t/o”. In an experiment, if the netlist is too small
TABLE I
DESCRIPTION OF ISCAS-85 CIRCUITS USED IN THIS PAPER.
Circuit #Gates #PIs #POs Circuit #Gates #PIs #POs Circuit #Gates #PIs #POs
c432 160 36 7 c1355 546 41 32 c3540 1669 50 22
c499 202 41 32 c1908 880 33 25 c5315 2307 178 123
c880 383 60 26 c2670 1269 233 140 c7552 3513 207 108
TABLE II
THE NUMBER OF CYCLES REPORTED DURING CYCSAT ATTACK. THE
EXPONENTIAL FITTING FUNCTION IS IN FORM OF c = 2mX .
Circuit N=1 N=2 N=3 N=5 N=10 N=15 m
c432 3,384 23,879 4.6 ∗ 105 NiS NiS NiS 6.3
c499 10 331 1528 1.4 ∗ 106 NiS NiS 4.1
c880 67 1,601 1,903 5.0 ∗ 106 t/o t/o 4.5
c1355 59 636 5.7 ∗ 105 1.9 ∗ 109 t/o t/o 6.2
c1908 13 294 12,594 1.3 ∗ 107 t/o t/o 4.8
c2670 273 1,570 8,912 2.9 ∗ 105 t/o t/o 3.6
c3540 1,215 5,991 8.7 ∗ 105 4.9 ∗ 108 t/o t/o 5.8
c5315 162 4,869 6,650 1.2 ∗ 109 t/o t/o 6.0
c7552 11 124 1,558 2.6 ∗ 105 1.2 ∗ 109 t/o 3.0
for insertion of the number of required feedbacks, its table
entry is marked as “Netlist is Small (NiS)”.
A. Exponential Growth in The Number of Cycles
1) Cyclification Using Super Cycles (SC): The number
of cycles created in ISCAS-85 benchmarks, when using N=1,
2, 3, 5, 10, and 15 MCs of size 7 (i.e., 7 gates in a cycle)
for building a SC is reported in Table II. Using curve fitting
techniques, the number of cycles in each netlist is also reported
as a function of the number of feedbacks X , in form of 2mX ,
in which m is the netlist-specific exponential acceleration
factor. The minimum bound for m (according to the discussion
in section IV-A1) when using SC is one. However, as reported
in Table II, the value of m is usually far larger than one,
meaning there would be a far larger number of cycles than
that expected from the SC-imposed minimum bound.
As illustrated in Table II, increasing the number of
feedbacks exponentially increases the number of cycles, such
that with only 15 feedbacks, the cycles in none of the netlists
could be counted in 10-hour limit. Note that, the designer can
exponentially increase CycSAT attack’s pre-processing time,
by linearly increasing the number of feedbacks. For executions
resulted in timeout, we also confirmed that initiating CycSAT
with incomplete NC clauses traps the SAT solver in an infinite
loop. Hence, the attacker can not complete the pre-processing
in a reasonable time, and incomplete pre-processing traps the
subsequent invocation of the SAT solver. The area overhead
for building the SC in terms of the number of switches depends
on the number of MCs and the number of gates in each MC.
The area overhead for having various numbers of MCs of 7
gates when building a SC is reported in Table III.
2) Cyclification using Logarithmic Feedback Networks
(LFN): As discussed and proved in section IV-A2, the lower
bound on the number of generated cycles, when the LFN
method for cyclification flow is adopted, is an exponential
function of the number of feedbacks. Furthermore, similar to
SC, the edge density of the original netlist may substantially
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TABLE III
PERCENTAGE OF AREA OVERHEAD FOR SC CREATION WHEN USING
DIFFERENT NUMBER OF MCS (N) OF LENGTH 7.
Circuit N=1 N=2 N=3 N=5 N=10 N=15 N=20
Area Overhead Percentages (%)
c432 7.50 13.75 20.00 NiS NiS NiS NiS
c499 5.94 10.89 15.84 25.74 NiS NiS NiS
c880 3.13 5.74 8.36 13.58 26.63 39.69 52.74
c1355 2.20 4.03 5.86 9.52 18.68 27.84 37.00
c1908 1.36 2.50 3.64 5.91 11.59 17.27 22.95
c2670 0.95 1.73 2.52 4.10 8.04 11.98 15.92
c3540 0.72 1.32 1.92 3.12 6.11 9.11 12.10
c5315 0.52 0.95 1.39 2.25 4.42 6.59 8.76
c7552 0.34 0.63 0.91 1.48 2.90 4.33 5.75
TABLE IV
NUMBER OF CYCLES REPORTED DURING CYCSAT ATTACK USING LFN
METHOD. N IS THE NUMBER OF SELECTED PATHS FOR CREATING LFN.
N=2 N=4 N=8 N=16 N=32
Lower Bound 3 24 16072 3.8× 1012 2.3× 1032
c432 26,578 NiS NiS NiS NiS
c499 192 278,577 1.3× 1010 t/o NiS
c880 8,836 4.5× 108 t/o t/o NiS
c1355 8.3× 106 t/o t/o t/o NiS
c1908 8.4× 107 t/o t/o t/o t/o
c2670 1.2× 107 t/o t/o t/o t/o
c3540 8.5× 109 t/o t/o t/o t/o
c5315 1.2× 109 t/o t/o t/o t/o
c7552 2.9× 109 t/o t/o t/o t/o
increase the number of created cycles. This is because of the
gates with fan-outs greater than one in selected logic path
segments. If the output of a gate in the LFN is connected
to the input(s) of another gate(s) in the same network, the
resulting net counts as an additional forward path. Then, each
forward path could be matched with a feedback, resulting
in an additional cycle. Considering that path segments are
selected from the FIC of the same primary output, there
exist many such connections (forward edges), resulting in the
generation of a far larger number of cycles than the guaranteed
minimum bound expected from using LFN. To illustrate this,
both the number of created cycles for each benchmark and the
theoretical lower bound (calculated using
∑N
l=1
(
N
l
)
(l−1)! as
proved in section IV-A2) is reported in Table IV. As illustrated,
for most of the obfuscated benchmarks with a LFN larger than
4, cycle enumeration results in timeout after 10 hours due to
the exponential number of created cycles. This indicates an
exponential runtime at the CycSAT pre-processing stage. The
area overhead for creating LFNs of different sizes (different
number of input paths) is reported in Table V. Note that in
both SC and LFN, the area overhead scales with the number
of inserted feedbacks and not the size of the circuit. Hence,
the area overhead is smaller in larger circuits.
Capturing the power overhead of cyclic obfuscation is more
involved. The leakage component of power overhead is a
function of the area overhead of the obfuscation solution,
and threshold voltage (VT) of inserted multiplexers. Using a
high-VT switch cell reduces the leakage impact, however, it
introduces additional delay [43]. In a simple implementation
where standard cells are selected from a single VT, the increase
in the leakage power is similar to the increase in the area. The
TABLE V
PERCENTAGE OF AREA OVERHEAD FOR AN INSERTED LFN FOR
DIFFERENT NUMBER OF SELECTED PATHS (N).
Circuit N=2 N=4 N=8 N=16 N=32
Area Overhead Percentages (%)
c432 5.00 NiS NiS NiS NiS
c499 3.96 11.88 27.72 79.21 NiS
c880 2.09 6.27 14.62 41.78 NiS
c1355 1.47 4.40 10.26 29.30 NiS
c1908 0.91 2.73 6.36 18.18 43.64
c2670 0.63 1.89 4.41 12.61 30.26
c3540 0.48 1.44 3.36 9.59 23.01
c5315 0.35 1.04 2.43 6.94 16.64
c7552 0.23 0.68 1.59 4.55 10.93
TABLE VI
THE POWER OVERHEAD OF SC AND LFN OF SIZE N=16.
Circuit SC (N=16) LFN (N=16)
Switching (%) Leakage (%) Switching (%) Leakage (%)
c432 NiS NiS NiS NiS
c499 NiS NiS 212.64 75.13
c880 38.09 44.85 56.67 38.82
c1355 12.79 32.77 13.26 24.6
c1908 8.42 19.1 13.38 15.66
c2670 14.14 15.96 13.17 12.32
c3540 8.76 10.79 3.86 8.88
c5315 5.75 8.51 6.13 6.7
c7552 2.88 5.78 7.79 4.4
dynamic power consumption, on the other hand, depends on
the switching activity of the inserted switches. After proper
activation, the switching activity of the inserted multiplexers
depends on the toggling rate of the correct input net to the
multiplexer. The net toggling activity, in turn, depends on
the level of controllability of that net and the probable input
scenario to the netlist. The power consumption of both the
LFN and SC-based solutions of size N=16 is provided in
Table VI. However, note that the power consumption could
improve (at the expense of timing and security) by modifying
the SC or LFN algorithm to choose nets with small toggling
rate to reduce the overhead of dynamic power consumption.
B. SAT, CycSAT and BeSAT Attack Resilience
Table VII captures the result of SAT, CycSAT, and BeSAT
attacks on ISCAS-85 benchmarks that are obfuscated using
our proposed solution. For generating the data in this table,
we prepared three sets of obfuscated benchmarks. The first
set of benchmarks is obfuscated with only two MCs using
the SC approach for obfuscation method. This group of
obfuscated benchmarks represents cyclification with a small
number of dummy cycles, with no real cycles. The netlists in
the second set, are first obfuscated using 10 SR-latches (by
using the input-dependency based obfuscation as described
in section IV-B2) and then are cyclified by inserting two
MCs. The second group represents the case where there are
some real cycles in the design, while the total number of
cycles is still small. The third group is similar to the second
group, however, the number of inserted MCs is increased
to 15. It represents obfuscated solutions with both real and
exponentially large number of dummy cycles. The results of
running SAT, CycSAT, and BeSAT is captured in Table VII.
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TABLE VII
SAT ATTACK, CYCSAT, AND BESAT EXECUTION TIME AFTER INSERTION OF A SC (N=2), INSERTION OF A SC AND 10 SR-LATCHES (N=2 +
SR-L=10), AND INSERTION OF 15 MCS AND 10 SR-LATCHES (N=15 + SR-L=10).
Circuit N=2 N=2 + SR-L=10 N=15 + SR-L=10
SAT #Cycles CycSAT-I SAT #Cycles CycSAT-I CycSAT-II BeSAT SAT #Cycles CycSAT-I CycSAT-II BeSAT
c432 Inf 23,879 2.56s Inf 1.65× 105 UNSAT 11.69s 35.48s Inf t/o UNSAT t/o t/o
c499 0.56s 236 0.10s Inf 397 UNSAT 0.11s 0.79s Inf t/o UNSAT t/o t/o
c880 Inf 1,601 0.24s Inf 7.87× 106 UNSAT 793.12s t/o Inf t/o UNSAT t/o t/o
c1355 Inf 636 0.12s Inf 5.00× 105 UNSAT 53.21s 134.56s Inf t/o UNSAT t/o t/o
c1908 0.28s 294 0.10s Inf 6,467 UNSAT 0.73s 170.74s Inf t/o UNSAT t/o t/o
c2670 Inf 1,570 0.23s Inf 7,412 UNSAT 0.92s 17.22s Inf t/o UNSAT t/o t/o
c3540 Inf 5,991 0.75s Inf 6,026 UNSAT 0.75s 22.67s Inf t/o UNSAT t/o t/o
c5315 Inf 4,869 0.61s Inf 2.59× 105 UNSAT 26.04s 370.08s Inf t/o UNSAT t/o t/o
c7552 Inf 124 0.189s Inf 164 UNSAT 0.19s 18.30s Inf t/o UNSAT t/o t/o
For c432 and c499, generating large number of MCs (15) was
not possible, hence, the largest number of possible MCs were
used in the generation of SC.
The first group introduces a small number of removable
cycles. As reported in Table VII, even the existence of
simple cycles traps the original SAT attack in an infinite
loop in most cases (except for two benchmarks that SAT
solver luckily chooses a sequence of inputs that avoid or exit
the trap). However, CycSAT, when uses the ”no structural
path” condition (CycSAT-I) for generating the cycle avoidance
clauses, easily breaks all obfuscated netlists. As illustrated in
this table and predicted in Equation 3, CycSAT runtime (which
includes the runtime for both pre-processing step and SAT
solver’s invocation) almost linearly varies with the number of
cycles in each netlist.
For the second group, where the original circuit is also
cyclified (using real cycles), the usage of CycSAT-I returns
UNSAT as it produces NC clauses that breaks the real Boolean
cycles. However, when CycSAT uses the ”no sensitizable path”
conditions (CycSAT-II), it breaks the obfuscation in all cases.
Most notable in this data is the increase in the runtime of
CycSAT attack (when compared to the first group) as the time
it takes to compose the NC condition for each cycle based
on ”no sensitizable path” condition is longer. This validates
the impact of logic cyclification on the runtime of CycSAT
attack. Another attack possibility is BeSAT attack. However,
the BeSAT attack should be slightly modified: considering that
the design contains real Boolean cycles, the “no sensitizable
path” condition (instead of “no structural path” in the BeSAT
attack as described in [34]) should be used for the generation
of the NC clauses. Hence, the attack could be carried by
generating a set of NC clauses (given a deadline) and then use
BeSAT to attack the obfuscation and recover from oscillating
and stateful cycle conditions. To model this attack, we set
“no sensitizable path” pre-processing deadline to 2 hours, and
BeSAT attack time to 8 hours (total of 10 hours attack time).
As shown for “N=2+SR-L=10”, all but one deobfuscation was
successful and in general, BeSAT underperform compared to
CycSAT-II attack. This is because there exists a small number
of cycles, and both CycSAT-II and BeSAT have found and
conditioned all cycles, however, BeSAT due to the runtime
monitoring of DIPs is slower compared to CycSAT-II attack.
Finally, for the third group, where the number of inserted
feedbacks is increased to 15, all three attacks fail. The
CycSAT-I is not applicable, as it will open real cycles, resulting
in netlist malfunction, and even if pre-processing of this
attack finishes it will exit as UNSAT. The CycSAT-II fails
as it can not finish the pre-processing on time. Note that by
increasing the number of feedbacks, the designer can easily
and exponentially increase the required pre-processing time
unreasonably long. The remaining attack possibility is the
BeSAT attack. In this case, the pre-processing of NC clauses
is carried until the time limit (2 hours) and then BeSAT attack
is carried out. Note that in this condition, the BeSAT starts the
SAT attack with a partial set of clauses generated in the pre-
processing step. However, as illustrated in Table VII, BeSAT
will reach the deadline after invalidating 100s of thousands
of keys. This is when there exist millions (or larger) other
keys that cause oscillating behavior which BeSAT has not yet
examined and pruned (one at a time) in the time limit.
As explained in section IV, BeSAT only works when the
number of undetected cycles (and un-conditioned keys) is
small. The BeSAT attack is slow and eliminates one-incorrect-
key at a time. This is when, in our proposed obfuscation
solution, there exists an exponentially large number of invalid
keys even after partial pre-processing: As a part of our
obfuscation solution (and to create real cycles), we are using
(diffused) SR-latches. To prevent stateful behavior, through
careful input-logic section (as described in section IV-B2),
we ensure that the value of SR input can not evaluate to
11 (condition for statefulness). For this purpose, the input
logic cone to S and R input is constructed by exploiting
the interdependency of selected wires in the netlist. However,
the selection of inputs is further hidden through routing
obfuscation. In this case, only with the application of the
correct key, the interdependence of the input wires will render
the SR-latch non-stateful (by skipping the 11 input). Let’s
assume S = g(K1, X) and R = f(K2, X), where the g and f
are the logic representing the input cone of S and R input to
the SR-latch, K1 and K2 are the key gates in the fan-in cone
of S and R, and the X is the choice of primary input. In this
scenario, any choice of K1, K2 and X that could make the
SR = 11 will result in a stateful circuit. From this analysis,
the worst-case scenario for BeSAT is a function of the size of
primary input X , and key selection K1 and K2 for which the
wire S and R evaluate to 1, which is an exponential function of
the key-length K = (K1
⋂
K2). Considering that our solution
builds a strongly-connected graph, the FIC of S and R could
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span to all the key-gates. Hence, the number of invalid keys
that should be banned is exponentially large. Considering this
discussion, and for a large number of key combinations that
should be banned (one at a time), as shown in the results for
“N=15+SR-L=10”, BeSAT attack does not work against our
proposed solution.
C. SAT, CycSAT and BeSAT Resiliency of Previous Methods
In this section, we study the effectiveness of previously
proposed cyclic logic solutions and compare them with our
proposed solution. To attack the prior art solutions we use
the modified CycSAT attack as described and formulated in
section III-B of this paper. The modified CycSAT attack works
similar to the original CycSAT attack, however, instead of
composing the NC clauses per detected feedback, it composes
the NC clauses per detected cycle.
The original cyclic locking method was introduced in [12]
where authors proposed inserting multiplexers in the circuit
to create cycles. This obfuscation solution attempts to create
irreducible cycles. This method can only create dummy cycles
as it does not affect the DAG nature of a combinational netlist
and is referenced in this paper as glsvlsi17. The second method
discussed here [35] considers CycSAT attack and tries to
defeat CycSAT-I using an auxiliary-circuit. This method was
discussed in section III-A. By adding the proposed auxiliary-
circuits to a design, real cycles are formed, converting the
DAG nature of the netlist to a DCG. The netlist is then
augmented with additional dummy cycles (similar to the
glsvlsi17 method), making the netlist to contain both real and
dummy cycles. In this paper, we use the name date18 to refer
to this cyclic obfuscation solution.
To assess the effectiveness of prior art solutions, we
modeled each of the glsvlsi17 and date18 to obfuscate the
ISCAS-85 benchmarks. To compare the evaluation results of
prior art to that of our proposed solution (in Table VII),
the glsvlsi17 method is implemented using 15 randomly
selected feedbacks of length 7, while the benchmarks prepared
using date18 solution are obfuscated using the same number
of feedbacks (15) and 10 real cycles (for DAG to DCG
transformation), implemented using the auxiliary-circuit as
described in [35]. For smaller benchmarks, where insertion
of this many feedbacks was not feasible, we have inserted
the largest feasible number of feedbacks. To show the
effectiveness of our solution in increasing the runtime of
the CycSAT pre-processing step, we have also evaluated the
number of generated cycles for each of the prior cyclic
obfuscation (glsvlsi17 and date18) solutions.
Table VIII captures our evaluation results for glsvlsi17 when
attacked using SAT, CycSAT-I, and BeSAT. As expected the
success of SAT attack on selected benchmarks is random,
as generated cycles could trap the SAT solver. Note that by
increasing the number of feedbacks, the chances of trapping
the SAT solver increases. CycSAT-I breaks the obfuscation and
finds the key to all but one obfuscated benchmark. For c1355,
cycles could not be processed within the 10-hour time limit,
and the attack is timed out. But this case is a great showcase to
see the power of BeSAT. As expected, BeSAT could also break
TABLE VIII
SAT ATTACK, MODIFIED CYCSAT, AND BESAT RESULTS FOR
EVALUATION OF GLSVLSI17 METHOD [12].
Circuit #Cycles SAT CycSAT-I BeSAT
Time Iteration Time Iteration Time Banned
c432 32 t/o - 0.02 1 0.45 0
c499 282 t/o - 0.05 1 0.88 0
c880 36 1.35 61 0.13 15 3.59 0
c1355 t/o t/o - t/o - 7220.83 3
c1908 1,625 t/o - 0.95 83 8.44 0
c2670 129 t/o - 2.26 19 55.11 0
c3540 606 0.63 41 0.70 14 10.03 0
c5315 4,216 1.7 33 1.19 45 32.75 0
c7552 1,117 2.35 105 1.77 73 43.24 0
TABLE IX
EVALUATING DATE18 OBFUSCATION [35] AGAINST SAT, CYCSAT AND
BESAT.
Circuit #Cycles SAT CycSAT-I CycSAT-II BeSAT
Time Iteration Time Iteration Time Iteration Time Banned
c432 62 t/o - 0.02 UNSAT 0.3 18 9.19 0
c499 1,157 t/o - 0.06 UNSAT 0.14 18 2.00 0
c880 56 t/o - 0.04 UNSAT 0.31 23 5.11 0
c1355 t/o t/o - t/o - t/o - 7268.77 12
c1908 1,645 1.99 144 0.02 UNSAT 0.88 68 205.02 0
c2670 149 t/o - 0.03 UNSAT 0.53 41 10.53 0
c3540 626 6.49 187 0.1 UNSAT 1.53 37 18.19 0
c5315 4,236 t/o - 0.05 UNSAT 2.06 60 30.45 0
c7552 1,137 t/o - 0.08 UNSAT 1.9 31 40.75 0
this obfuscation. Considering that the pre-processing for most
of the benchmarks could be done in less than 2-hours, and all
cycles could be found for such small obfuscations, the number
of banned keys for all cases but one is zero. For this reason
and for the additional overhead of runtime monitoring of SAT
execution time, the BeSAT takes longer than CycSAT-I. The
only interesting scenario is for c1355, where the CycSAT-I is
timed out and can not finish the pre-processing of all cycles.
In this case, the incomplete set of NCs is used in BeSAT, and
with only 3 banned keys, BeSAT skips the traps and finds the
correct key. Note that the reason why BeSAT does work is that
the number of oscillating keys generated in this obfuscation
solution is small. This is unlike our proposed solution that
there exists an exponentially large number of such keys, and
if given to BeSAT, they have to be eliminated one at a time.
Table IX captures evaluation results for date18 method.
Aware of the shortcomings of glsvlsi17, the date18 solution
was proposed as a CycSAT-resistant obfuscation solution. The
proposed auxiliary-circuit by itself has a minimal impact on
the number of cycles. However, this method is expected to
have a larger number of stateful cycles, and when the original
SAT attack used there are higher chances for trapping the SAT
solver in an infinite loop. The results in Table IX support this
hypothesis, as only two benchmarks are successfully attacked
using the base SAT attack. When attacked using CycSAT-I,
the date18 solution remains resistant as the pre-processing
step of CycSAT-I incorrectly opens the real cycles during NC
clause generation. However, when the modified CycSAT-II
attack, as described in section III, is deployed, could easily
break all instances of obfuscated solutions except c1355 (that
could not be pre-processed in a reasonable time for having a
very large number of cycles). However, in the case of BeSAT
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and after limiting the pre-processing time to two hours, the
key for c1355 could be recovered in 68.77s after 2 hours
of NC clause generation. Other benchmarks that previously
was broken by CycSAT-II are also broken by BeSAT with
zero banned keys since the generated NC clauses cover all
undesirable cycle conditions. Note that for this attack, the NC
clauses for BeSAT are generated using the “no sensitizable
path” condition, otherwise the attack will return as UNSAT.
Comparing the glsvlsi17 and date18 data in Tables VIII and
IX with that of our proposed solution in Table VII illustrate
the effectiveness of our solution: none of the obfuscated
netlists using our solution could be broken by SAT, CycSAT-
I, CycSAT-II, or BeSAT (original and modified) attacks, as
it includes a solution to trap both the SAT solver and pre-
processing step of CycSAT/BeSAT. Note that, when deploying
SAT or CycSAT attack to break glsvlsi17 or date18, the
runtime, in addition to the number of inserted feedbacks,
also depends on the selection of feedbacks. Hence, a random
selection of feedbacks in glsvlsi17 and date18 results in
considerable variation in the attack time. Therefore, these
solutions, unlike our proposed solution, can not guarantee a
monotonic increase in the runtime of the attack as the number
of randomly selected feedbacks increases. Note that in our
solution, the runtime is dominated by CycSAT’s or BeSAT’s
pre-processing step, and this runtime is linearly dependent
on the number of cycles, and the number of cycles is an
exponential function of the number of inserted feedbacks.
Hence, we can guarantee a monotonic increase in the overall
runtime of the attack against our proposed solution as the
number of inserted feedbacks increases.
D. Timing Aware Cyclification
As described in section V, inserting logic gates in
timing-critical paths would increase the critical path of the
netlist resulting in a performance penalty. To minimize the
performance penalty to the extent possible, we proposed
a timing aware cyclic obfuscation flow in section V. This
solution would only affect the timing if it can no longer use
non-critical timing paths for feedback insertion.
Table X captures the result of our proposed timing
aware cyclic obfuscation when allowing 0% and 5% delay
overhead for cyclic obfuscation. Using this delay constraint,
the algorithm tries to insert the maximum number of feasible
feedbacks in each benchmark using the SC solution proposed
in section IV-A1. In this table, we have provided a measure
of the maximum number of MCs that could be implemented
in each benchmark for building a strongly connected graph
before running out of usable gates. The key count is the sum
of the number of key values needed for managing the MCs and
the number of key values needed for managing the additional
multiplexers (used for creating outgoing edges from internal
gates in each MC). As illustrated, the maximum number of
MCs and key values is a function of the netlist size and the
acceptable delay overhead. Note that in larger benchmarks,
even without incurring a time penalty we can insert a large
number of MCs, pushing CycSAT attack to be trapped in its
pre-processing step until timeout. In addition, note that with 10
MCs, our C++ implementation of pre-processor can not finish
TABLE X
TIMING-AWARE OBFUSCATION RESULTS FOR THE SUPER CYCLE METHOD.
MAXIMUM NUMBER OF MICRO CYCLES ARE INSERTED FOR 0% AND 5%
OVERHEAD OVER TIMING SLACK.
Circuit Slack = 5% Slack = 0%
#Cycles SAT(s) #Keys #MCs #Cycles SAT(s) #Keys #MCs Area %
c432 303,476 0.14 15 2 NiS NiS NiS NiS NiS
c499 NiS NiS NiS NiS NiS NiS NiS NiS NiS
c880 t/o t/o 95 18 t/o 0.23 51 12 26.63
c1355 t/o t/o 109 23 2,766 0.55 25 8 9.16
c1908 t/o t/o 187 38 t/o t/o 111 24 25.23
c2670 t/o t/o 335 70 t/o t/o 244 53 38.46
c3540 t/o t/o 378 75 t/o t/o 274 57 32.83
c5315 t/o t/o 448 110 t/o t/o 446 95 38.66
c7552 t/o t/o 729 183 t/o t/o 632 158 35.98
counting the number of generated cycles, and according to
SC and LFN lemmas proved in sections IV-A1 and IV-A2,
the number of generated cycles exponentially grows with
each added feedback. Hence, we can make the attack-time
unreasonably long with no or limited timing impact.
The number of MCs and the number of gates in each
MC (e.g., cycle length) could affect the number of created
cycles and defines the SAT resiliency of the circuit. Parameters
like targeted frequency and area overheads should also be
considered during cyclic obfuscation. However, this could
create a trade-off on how SAT-resilient a circuit is versus how
efficiently it could be implemented.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a new mean of cyclic obfuscation
that is immune to SAT, CycSAT and BeSAT attacks. To
make the pre-processing step of CycSAT and BeSAT attacks
ineffective, we proposed two mechanisms (SC and LFN) for
exponentially increasing the number of generated cycles with
respect to the number of inserted feedbacks. In addition,
we proposed three mechanisms to cyclify the circuit with
real cycles (Cyclic Boolean Logic). The addition of real
cycles forces an attacker to generate the “no sensitizable
path” conditions during the pre-processing step of CycSAT or
BeSAT attacks, which is considerably more time consuming
than “no structural path” generation. The exponential increase
in the number of feedbacks prevents the attacker from
generating NC conditions for all cycles in a reasonable amount
of time. This breaks CycSAT attack. The BeSAT attack can
proceed to its SAT stage with an incomplete set of NC clauses,
however, it has to ban remaining invalid keys one at a time,
and there exists an exponentially large number of such keys.
Hence, it also fails to break the proposed solution.
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